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7 October 国庆期间有两个事情比较值得关注，一是美国国会上演的救市法案的闹剧；二是美国要对台65亿美元军售。这两者看起来是没有什么直接联系，但政治学的艺术可谓淋漓尽致。美国国会中持反对救市法案的众议员大多数人也都知道，现在不是讨论自由主义存亡、纳税人利益的时候，通过与否决在于既要安抚支持他们的那部分选民和狙击金融危机对实体经济更深的冲击,在这两者之间做个取舍。 在“世界是平的”（托马斯弗里德曼）时候，各国之间是千丝万缕的联系，美国政府也知道这次的金融危机他需要全世界的拯救，他要发的债券需要中国、日本和中东石油国的美元储备来买单，日本是它的盟友，中东石油国大多也是，而中国是它未来的竞争对手，并不能够一味的唯马首是瞻。而台海局势在国民党重新执政后，太安静了，这并不完全符合美国的战略利益啊，于是他搞出来台湾军售，背后的目的无非是想加上砝码，要中国加大援手的力度，60多亿的军火钱对救市那是杯水车薪，不过是想耍一副无赖的脸面，请您援手吧。大家所要交换都是国家核心利益，谁也不亏待谁。 写到这里，我到觉得，我们也别去买那些极可能变成垃圾的债券，救市可以，让美国人把洛克希德马丁的股权作抵押吧。  23 September “每一个泡沫都会有一根针来刺穿它”——对于华尔街来说，次级房地产贷款大面积违约就是那根针。2008年的这个秋天，这根针绊倒了158年的雷曼、94年的美林和84年的贝尔斯登，刺破了美国引以为傲的“华尔街神话”。
上周日晚，美联储批准了高盛和摩根士丹利（以下称“大摩”）由投行转型为传统银行控股的申请，这意味着，在美国以证券业务为核心的投行从以吸纳存款为核心的商业银行中分离75年后，终于等来“华尔街投行的终结”。至此，华尔街前五大投行尽数沉没，美国金融机构正面临上世纪30年代经济大萧条以来最大的格局大调整。
一直以来，投资银行是华尔街的灵魂和骄傲，他们一方面从事着证券买卖、为客户提供咨询服务，享受着这些业务带来的高额利润；一方面却比传统银行受到更少的监管。而他们也曾经“不负众望”，为美国的经济创造了一个又一个辉煌。
有分析认为，对于风行华尔街近百年的投行模式的突然没落，很重要的一点在于这些公司过于依赖甚至是滥用杠杆，而正是“高杠杆”在相当长一段时间内创造了华尔街的盈利神话。
投行转型 以自由换生存
据了解，高盛将由美国联储局监管，并将成为第四大银行控股公司。而大摩也在积极转型为银行控股公司。
这意味着他们一方面可以开展储蓄业务吸收存款，另一方面还可以与其他商业银行一样永久享受从美联储获得紧急贷款的权利。不过，在获得帮助的同时，他们也要付出相当的代价：必须接受更多、更严厉的监管。两者将接受美联储监管，并纳入美国联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)的管理。同时，它们的盈利水平也将远不及从前。
对于这种变化及其所带来的传统存款银行称霸的局面，不少市场人士持乐观态度，他们认为，存款是当前危机时刻唯一有意义的赚钱方式；同时，这种经营模式风险较小，不过这也意味着员工薪酬可能会降低，华尔街的高薪时代也将一去不复返。
上周，高盛和摩根士丹利还宣称将坚持一贯的路线。不过，在股价崩盘和客户“敬而远之”后，两家机构的总裁无奈表示“别无选择”。次贷危机已经逼单一投行模式走上绝路，它们只有开拓其他业务，以求均衡发展。
高盛的财报显示，在到8月29日截止的三个月内，高盛净收入下降为8.45亿美元，而一年前高盛的净收入为28.5亿美元，高盛季度盈利出现其上市以来最大跌幅；摩根士丹利盈利也有小幅下滑。
在摩根士丹利昨日的一份声明中，其首席执行官麦晋桁表示，新模式将有利于确保摩根士丹利以稳定性和灵活性兼具的状态开展业务，也有利于市场消除对其融资能力和金融状况的怀疑。
然而，最基本的银行业务并非包治华尔街问题的万灵药。杜克大学金融学教授哈维说，投行与商业银行合并并没有明显的经济效益。
神话破灭 高杠杆之祸
不久前的华尔街还是全球金融中心。这里汇聚了全球顶尖的投资银行及各类投资机构，每天有数以千亿计的美元在这里流动。特别是，大型投行研究员动辄可以拿到数千万美元的年终花红，令华尔街成为众多年轻人的梦想之都。
不过，繁华的背后危机暗藏，华尔街过度依赖杠杆交易。通过各种杠杆交易设计出的金融衍生品纷繁复杂，甚至有华尔街资深交易员也坦言，不知道自己交易的品种是什么，它的风险到底有多高。而过去几年，杠杆比率快速提升。据瑞银的数据，美林的杠杆率从2003年的15倍飙升至去年的28倍。摩根士丹利的杠杆率攀升至33倍，高盛也达到28倍（杠杆率是一个公司资产负债表上的风险与资产之比）。华尔街的金融泡沫越来越大。
次贷危机正在推倒以“放大信用和自由市场化”为基础的美国金融秩序。正如美国曼哈顿大学金融学教授Charles Geisst在《华尔街：一段历史》中所写道的：“随着它们(高盛和摩根士丹利)不得不投身存款业务以求自保，高杠杆时代将结束，随风而去的还有曾经那一张张印着总统头像的丰厚回报。”
1970年代以来，抵押债券、杠杆收购（LBO）、期权、互换、资产证券化等金融衍生工具层出不穷，而这一切，都有高杠杆、高利益的深层原因。
在市场好的时候，一切风平浪静，一旦出现危机，高杠杆的放大效应让人难以承受。杠杆的滥用导致最后资不抵债而评级日益降低，直到没有生存空间。事实上，高盛和大摩一直采取措施减少杠杆，但市场上的许多资产价格都节节下跌，因此减少杠杆并不容易。
相比之下，美国银行和Wachovia截至第二季度的杠杆率为11倍，不到四大投行平均水平的一半。他们对资本充足率的要求及杠杆的使用有更严格的控制，风险相对小很多。这也是投行转身传统银行的原因之一。
金融创新 合久必分 分久必合
1929-1933年的美国经济危机就与商业银行在证券业的过度投机有关。经济危机直接导致了大批投资银行的倒闭。当时联邦政府认为投资银行业务有较高的风险，禁止商业银行利用储户的资金参加投行业务，结果一大批综合性银行被迫分解为商业银行和投资银行。其中最典型的例子就是：摩根银行分解为从事投资银行业务的摩根士丹利，以及从事商业银行业务的摩根大通。自此之后，投行就逐渐分别由商业银行和证券经纪人发展而来。一个崭新的独立的投资银行业在经济危机的萧条中崛起。
自上世纪80年代以来，美国的金融创新加快发展，特别是金融衍生工具方面，而其中华尔街投行又是金融创新的扛旗者。在利润的诱惑下，在金融衍生工具的支撑下，华尔街投行推出的一个个令人眼花缭乱的金融衍生品成为市场的宠儿，给投机者创造了各种牟利机会，各大投行也收获颇丰。华尔街通过金融创新，屡次成功拯救濒危经济，在这种光环映照下，不少新兴经济体的经济官员、经济学家与市场人士对美国金融创新的追捧几乎到了无以复加的程度。
然而，华尔街在大力进行金融创新的同时，风险评估无法跟得上金融创新和金融衍生工具的发展，导致金融机构愈加强大的同时也愈加脆弱，并积累了大量风险。在美国政府主权信用的担保下，全世界投资者都进了美国通过金融创新设立的次级债市场。评级公司、担保公司、银行、投行、经济行都在分享次贷这种金融创新带来的利润，而积累的风险却没有引起相关监管机构的足够注意。房地产泡沫一破灭，所谓的金融创新遭遇当头棒喝，而这次的金融风暴，无疑是对此前众多金融创新的秋后算账。
如今高盛和大摩的“回归”刚好印证了中国的古语“合久必分，分久必合”。国信证券证券发展研究总部总经理何诚颖认为，五大投行所暴露出来的问题主要是风险管理不够。投行纷纷投向商业银行的怀抱，正是为了增强抗风险能力，混业是必走之路。相比较而言，投行的优势主要是投资和创新，大银行虽然经营保守一点，但风险管理则更要强一些，流动性也要好一些。
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在市场好的时候，一切风平浪静，一旦出现危机，高杠杆的放大效应让人难以承受。杠杆的滥用导致最后资不抵债而评级日益降低，直到没有生存空间。事实上，高盛和大摩一直采取措施减少杠杆，但市场上的许多资产价格都节节下跌，因此减少杠杆并不容易。
相比之下，美国银行和Wachovia截至第二季度的杠杆率为11倍，不到四大投行平均水平的一半。他们对资本充足率的要求及杠杆的使用有更严格的控制，风险相对小很多。这也是投行转身传统银行的原因之一。
金融创新 合久必分 分久必合
1929-1933年的美国经济危机就与商业银行在证券业的过度投机有关。经济危机直接导致了大批投资银行的倒闭。当时联邦政府认为投资银行业务有较高的风险，禁止商业银行利用储户的资金参加投行业务，结果一大批综合性银行被迫分解为商业银行和投资银行。其中最典型的例子就是：摩根银行分解为从事投资银行业务的摩根士丹利，以及从事商业银行业务的摩根大通。自此之后，投行就逐渐分别由商业银行和证券经纪人发展而来。一个崭新的独立的投资银行业在经济危机的萧条中崛起。
自上世纪80年代以来，美国的金融创新加快发展，特别是金融衍生工具方面，而其中华尔街投行又是金融创新的扛旗者。在利润的诱惑下，在金融衍生工具的支撑下，华尔街投行推出的一个个令人眼花缭乱的金融衍生品成为市场的宠儿，给投机者创造了各种牟利机会，各大投行也收获颇丰。华尔街通过金融创新，屡次成功拯救濒危经济，在这种光环映照下，不少新兴经济体的经济官员、经济学家与市场人士对美国金融创新的追捧几乎到了无以复加的程度。
然而，华尔街在大力进行金融创新的同时，风险评估无法跟得上金融创新和金融衍生工具的发展，导致金融机构愈加强大的同时也愈加脆弱，并积累了大量风险。在美国政府主权信用的担保下，全世界投资者都进了美国通过金融创新设立的次级债市场。评级公司、担保公司、银行、投行、经济行都在分享次贷这种金融创新带来的利润，而积累的风险却没有引起相关监管机构的足够注意。房地产泡沫一破灭，所谓的金融创新遭遇当头棒喝，而这次的金融风暴，无疑是对此前众多金融创新的秋后算账。
如今高盛和大摩的“回归”刚好印证了中国的古语“合久必分，分久必合”。国信证券证券发展研究总部总经理何诚颖认为，五大投行所暴露出来的问题主要是风险管理不够。投行纷纷投向商业银行的怀抱，正是为了增强抗风险能力，混业是必走之路。相比较而言，投行的优势主要是投资和创新，大银行虽然经营保守一点，但风险管理则更要强一些，流动性也要好一些。 | 18 September
A weekend of high drama reshapes American finance
一个极富戏剧性的周末重塑了美国的金融体系
EVEN by the standards of the worst financial crisis for at least a generation, the events of Sunday Spetember14th and the day before were extraordinary. The weekend began with hopes that a deal could be struck, with or without government backing, to save Lehman Brothers, America’s fourth-largest investment bank. It ended with Lehman’s set for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and the bank preparing to wind itself up after those efforts failed. Other vulnerable financial giants scrambled to sell themselves or raise enough capital to stave off a similar fate. Merrill Lynch, the third-biggest investment bank, sold itself to Bank of America (BofA), an erstwhile Lehman suitor, in a $50 billion all-stock deal. American International Group (AIG) brought forward a potentially life-saving overhaul and went cap-in-hand to the Federal Reserve.
即使以至少一代人所经历的最坏的金融危机的标准来看，上周六及周日（9月14日）的事件仍是非同寻常的。那个周末开始于拯救美国第四大投行雷曼兄弟的交易有望达成，无论有或者没有政府的支持。然而却以雷曼兄弟的所有努力均告失败后，根据美国破产法案第11章申请破产保护而告终。其它脆弱的金融巨头同样努力地将自己卖出或是筹集足够的资金以避免与雷曼相同的命运。第三大投行美林以500亿美元全额换股交易将自己卖给了以前雷曼的收购者–美国银行。美国国际集团（AIG）正在提出一个潜在的挽救重整方案，并且毕恭毕敬地照美联储脸色行事。
On Sunday night the situation was still fluid, with bankers and regulators working to limit the fallout. They were girding themselves for a dreadful Monday in the markets. Australia’s stockmarket opened sharply lower on Monday (most other Asian bourses were closed). American stock futures were deep in the red too, and the dollar weaker. Spreads on risky credit, already elevated, widened further.
在周日晚上，形势仍然非常不明朗。银行家们和监管者都在努力减小这次事件的辐射影响。他们准备应付非常糟糕的”黑色星期一”。澳大利亚股市周一大幅低开（其它大多数亚洲股票交易所都停牌了）。美国股指期货下跌非常厉害，同时美元汇率也走低。已经很高的信贷风险的息差变得更高。
With these developments the crisis is entering a new and extremely dangerous phase. If Lehman’s assets are dumped in a liquidation, prices of like assets on other firms’ books will also have to be marked down, eroding their capital bases. The government’s refusal to help with a bail-out of Lehman will strip many firms of the benefit of being thought too big to fail, raising their borrowing costs. Lehman’s demise highlights the industry’s inability, or unwillingness, to rescue the sick, even when the consequences of inaction are potentially dire.
随着这些进展，危机已经进入极其危险的阶段。如果雷曼的资产在清算时遭到抛售，其它公司帐上的资产同样会减值缩水，这会侵蚀其资本基础。美国政府对雷曼的拒绝支持会使其它许多公司失去”大就不会倒”的优势，从而大大增加这些公司的借款成本。雷曼的死亡更加凸显了金融业无力，或者不愿意去拯救伤病者，即使这样不作为潜在的后果非常可怕。
The biggest worry is the effect on derivatives markets, particularly the giant one for credit-default swaps. Lehman is a top-ten counterparty in CDS, holding contracts with a notional value of almost $800 billion. If it were to cease trading, chaos could ensue. On Sunday, banks called in their derivatives traders to assess their exposures to Lehman and work on mitigating risks. In a highly unusual, hastily convened weekend trading session, the market’s main players sought to reduce the risk hanging over Lehman’s outstanding trades by matching buyers of its swaps directly with sellers, thus cutting Lehman out of the equation. But only $1 billion-2 billion of trades were executed. The Securities and Exchange Commission, Lehman’s main regulator, said it is working with the bank to protect clients and trading partners and to “maintain orderly markets”.
最令人担心是这次事件对衍生品市场的影响，特别是那些从事信贷违约交易的巨头。雷曼是信贷违约交易的十家最大公司之一，据估计它持有约8000亿美元的合同。如果雷曼停止交易，那么市场混乱便会随之发生。周日，各大银行都召集其衍生品交易员来评估其与雷曼的交易量并着力于减少风险。更加非同寻常的是，在匆忙召开的周末交易会上，市场的主要参与者为减少风险决定将雷曼未执行的交易搁置，然后让买家与卖家直接交易，这样就将雷曼排除到交易之外了。然而仅有10到20亿的交易得以执行。雷曼的主要监管者–美国证券交易委员表示将会和银行一起来保护客户和贸易合伙人，并”保持一个有秩序的市场”。
Government officials believed they had persuaded a consortium of Wall Street firms to back a new vehicle that would take $40 billion-70 billion of dodgy assets off Lehman’s books, thereby facilitating a takeover of the remainder. But the deal died when the main suitors, BofA and Barclays, a British bank, walked away on Sunday afternoon. Both were unwilling to buy the firm, even shorn of the worst bits, without some sort of government backstop.
政府官员相信他们已经说服一家由华尔街许多公司组成的财团来支持成立一个新的工具。此工具用来除去雷曼帐上400到700亿美元的危险资产，因而减轻对雷曼剩余部分收购的困难。但是这个协议由于主要的潜在收购者–美国银行和英国的巴克莱银行在周日下午的退出而告失败。即使除去雷曼最坏资产，但是在没有政府的支援下上述两家银行都不愿意收购雷曼。
But Hank Paulson, the treasury secretary, decided to draw a line and refuse such help. After the Fed had bailed out Bear Stearns in March and the Treasury had taken over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac last weekend, expectations were high that they would do the same for Lehman. And that was precisely the problem: it would have confirmed that the federal government stood behind all risk-taking in the financial system, creating moral hazard that would take years to undo and expanding taxpayers’ liability almost without limit. Conceivably, Congress could have denied Mr Paulson the money he needed even if he had been inclined to bail Lehman out.
但是美国财政部长保尔森却决定与此收购事件划清界限，拒绝提供帮助。在三月份美联储为贝尔斯登作保和上周财政部接管两房之后，人们都高度期望他们对雷曼也会这么做。而这恰恰是个问题：政府为金融系统的任何风险都担保的话，由此造成的道德危机要花好几年时间才会消去，而且将纳税人的责任几乎无限制地放大了。因此，即使保尔森打算拯救雷曼，肯定也会被国会否决掉的。
This left Lehman with no option but to prepare for bankruptcy. Though the bank has access to a Fed lending facility, introduced after Bear’s takeover by JP Morgan Chase, the collapse of its share price left it unable to raise new equity and facing crippling downgrades from rating agencies. Moreover, rival firms that had continued to trade with it in recent weeks-at the urging of regulators-had begun to pull away in the past few days. The inability to find a buyer is a huge blow to Lehman’s 25,000 employees, who own a third of the company’s now-worthless stock; in such a difficult environment, most will struggle to find work at other financial firms. It also makes for an ignominious end to the career of Dick Fuld, Lehman’s boss since 1994, who until last year was viewed as one of Wall Street’s smartest managers.
这迫使雷曼除了破产外没有其它选择。虽然雷曼可以获取在贝尔斯登被摩根大通收购后引入的美联储借贷机制，但是雷曼股价的崩盘导致其无法再筹得新的资本并且面临着将要被评级机构降低等级。此外，这几周被监管者促使与雷曼交易的竞争对手都在过去几天里抽身。无法找到一个买家对雷曼25000名雇员打击颇大，他们拥有雷曼三分之一的股份，现在这些股份已经没有多少价值了。在这样困难的环境下，绝大部分雇员都开始努力去其它金融机构找工作了。这对1994年上任至今的雷曼老板迪克福德来说，也是职业生涯耻辱的终结，而直到去年他还被看作华尔街最出色的管理者之一。
Merrill’s rush to sell itself was motivated by fear that it might be next to be caught in the stampede. Despite selling a big dollop of its most rotten assets recently, the market continued to question its viability. Its shares fell by 36% last week, and hedge funds had started to move their business elsewhere. Its boss, John Thain, concluded that it needed to strike a deal before markets reopened. It approached several firms, including BofA and Morgan Stanley, but only BofA felt able to conduct the necessary due diligence in time.
美林将其迅速地卖出是担心自己将成为下一个受害者。尽管最近美林除去了其最坏的资产，但是市场仍然继续质疑其生存能力。上周其股价下跌36％，而且对冲基金已开始将其生意转到别处。美林的老板John Thain决定在市场反应前就达成出售的交易。美林接触了好几个公司，包括美国银行和摩根斯坦利，但是只有美国银行感觉能够来的及进行必要的严格评估。
Not only has Mr Thain managed to shelter his firm from the storm, but he has also secured a price well above its closing price last Friday, $29 per share compared with $17. How he managed that in such an ugly market is not yet clear. Ken Lewis, BofA’s boss, is no fan of investment banking, but he is a consummate opportunist, and he has coveted Merrill’s formidable retail brokerage. Still, the deal carries risks. It will be a logistical challenge, all the more so since BofA is in the middle of digesting Countrywide, a big mortgage lender. Commercial-bank takeovers of investment banks have a horrible history because of the stark cultural differences. And it is not clear if BofA has a clear picture of Merrill’s remaining troubled assets.
Thain先生不仅设法使其公司找到了一个躲避风暴的港湾，而且他获得的收购价也比其上周五的收盘价17美元高，达到29美元。他如何能在如此险恶的市场中得到这些还尚不清楚。美国银行的老板Ken Lewis并不是投资银行的爱好者，但是他却是个老道的投机者，他早就对美林规模庞大的零售业务垂涎三尺了。当然，这笔交易仍有风险。这是个搬运的力气活，因为美国银行还正在消化一家大型的抵押贷款商Countrywide。商业银行收购投资银行有着很糟糕的历史，因为二者的文化完全不同。而且美国银行是否对美林剩下的不良资产有个清晰的处理蓝图尚不清除。
The takeover of Merrill leaves just two large independent investment banks in America, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. Both are in better shape than their erstwhile rivals. But this weekend’s events cast a shadow over the standalone model, with its reliance on leverage and skittish wholesale funding.
美林被收购后美国只剩下两家大型独立的投资银行–摩根斯坦利和高盛。他们的情况比以前的竞争对手都要好。但上周末的重大事件给依赖杠杆和承销融资的独立投行模式笼上一层阴影。
Wall Street has company in its misery. Washington Mutual, a big thrift, is fighting for survival under a new boss. Even more worryingly, so is AIG, America’s largest insurer, thanks to a reckless foray into CDS of mortgage-linked collateralised-debt obligations. Investors have fled, fearing the firm will need a lot more new capital than the $20 billion raised so far. Prompted by the weekend bloodletting, AIG brought forward to Monday a restructuring that was to have been unveiled on September 25th. This was expected to include the sale of its aircraft-leasing arm and other businesses. It is also reported to be seeking a $40 billion in bridge loan from the Fed, to be repaid once the sales go through, in the hope that this will attract new capital, possibly from private-equity firms.
华尔街有着身陷困境的公司。大型金融机构华盛顿互惠银行正在新老板的带领下为生存而挣扎。美国最大的保险商–美国国际集团由于其贸然进入抵押相关的债务抵押债券的信贷违约交易，更值得人担忧。由于担心其需要远多于现在已筹集到的200亿美元的资金，投资者纷纷撤离。由于这周末的失血过多，美国国际集团进行一个重组。这次重组本打算于9月25日进行。重组包括出售其飞机租赁部门及其它业务。据报道，它还打算向美联储借400亿的过渡资金直到交易完成就归还。这样做是为了吸引可能来自私募股权公司的新的资金。
With Lehman left dangling, official attention is now turning to putting more safeguards in place to soften the coming shock to markets and the economy. The first step has been to encourage Lehman’s counterparties to get together and try to net out as many contracts as possible. On Sunday the Fed also expanded the list of collateral it will accept for loans at its discount window, to include even equities; and dealers may lend any investment-grade security, not just triple-A rated, to the Fed in exchange for Treasury bonds.
随着雷曼摇摇欲坠，官方已将注意力放到布置更多安全措施以减少对市场和经济的冲击。第一步是鼓励雷曼的同行都团结起来以获取尽可能多的合同净收入。周日美联储也在其贴现窗口扩大了其贷款可接受的附属担保物的列表，甚至包括股权；而且交易者可以以任何投资级别的证券，而不仅仅是3A级别的证券给美联储来换取美国国债。
Markets are also pricing in some possibility that the Fed will cut its short-term interest rate target from 2% when it meets for a regularly scheduled meeting on Tuesday. That would be an abrupt turnaround from August, when officials figured their next move would be to raise rates, not lower them.
美联储将会在周二例会上降低其短期利率2％的目标，这会使市场重新定价。这是自八月来的大调整，当时官方计划调高其利率而不是调低。
In a sign of how bad things are, even straitened banks are stumping up cash to help the stabilisation efforts. On Sunday, a group of ten banks and securities firms set up a $70 billion loan facility that any of the founding members can tap if it finds itself short of cash.
现在确实是困难的时刻，连非常拮据的银行也掏出钱来支持稳定计划。周日，十家银行与证券公司组成的团体建立了一个700亿美元的贷款工具，任何一个创建者都可以在其缺乏现金的时候使用。
Even if markets can be stabilised this week, the pain is far from over-and could yet spread. Worldwide credit-related losses by financial institutions now top $500 billion, of which only $350 billion of equity has been replenished. This $150 billion gap, leveraged 14.5 times (the average gearing for the industry), translates to a $2 trillion reduction in liquidity. Hence the severe shortage of credit and predictions of worse to come.
即使市场本周能够稳定，痛苦远远没有过去–而且还会扩散开来。世界范围内金融机构的信贷相关的损失现在达5000亿美元，这其中仅有3500亿资产得以补充。这1500亿的缺口，被放大14.5倍（金融业的平均放大倍数），将达2万亿的资金流的减少。因此更严重的信贷短缺和更坏的预期将会到来。
Indeed, most analysts think that the deleveraging still has far to go. Some question how much has taken place. Bianco Research notes that while the credit positions of the 20 largest banks have fallen by $300 billion, to $1.3 trillion, since the Fed started its special lending facilities, the same amount has been financed by the Fed itself through these windows. In other words, instead of deleveraging, the banks have just shifted a chunk of their risk to the central bank. As spectacular as this weekend was, more drama is on the way.
确实，绝大多数分析员认为减债还有很长的路要走。有人质疑究竟减了多少债。Bianco Research注意到， 20家最大的银行的贷款头寸降低了3000亿美元至1.3万亿美元，因为美联储启动了其专门的放贷工具，这些资金(3000亿美元)由美联储自己通过这些窗口发放给这些银行(20家降低了贷款头寸的银行)。换句话说，不用减债，这些银行将其自己的风险转给了中央银行。如同上周末精彩的戏剧一样，还有更多的剧目即将上演。
Covered bonds
有资产抵押证券
From Prussia with love
源自普鲁士之爱
Sep 11th 2008
From The Economist print edition
An ancient debt instrument may help America after Fannie and Freddie.
房利美和房地美之后，古老的债务证券或许能够帮助美国。
FROM Freddie Mac to Frederick the Great? Fannie Mae and its brother are the central pillars of America’s mortgage market. Their role has become even more important during the credit crisis, thanks to the moribund private-securitisation market (see chart). If they were eventually to disappear, what might take their place? One alternative is covered bonds-Prussia’s legacy to modern finance.
从房地美到腓特烈大帝？房利美和房地美是美国抵押贷款市场的中流砥柱。在信贷危机期间，由于私营证券化市场严重萎缩，因此他们的角色变得更为重要。如果两房最终消失，那么谁将取代他们？选择之一就是有资产抵押证券–普鲁士对现代金融的遗产。
First issued by the German kingdom in 1770, covered bonds have grown into a $3 trillion asset class, dominated by issuers in Europe. The instrument is a form of senior debt that is paid back from the issuer’s cash flows but is also secured against a ring-fenced pool of assets, such as mortgage loans, in the event of default. That makes it safer than unsecured debt. But covered bonds also offer more protection to investors than asset-backed securities, because the issuer retains the credit risk, rather than securitising it away, and must also keep the cover pool up to snuff by replacing non-performing loans with performing ones. For extra safety, the pool contains more collateral than the value of the bond.
有资产抵押证券由普鲁士王国于1770年首次发行，如今它已经发展成为具有3万亿美元规模的资产类型，主要由欧洲的发行者所控制。这种证券是优先债务形式的一种，发行者需要用自己的现金流来偿还，并且要有一定隔离的资产池作为保障，比如说抵押贷款,以免发生不能履行责任的情况。这就使得它比其它无担保债务更加安全。同时，相比其它资产担保证券，它也能为投资者提供更多的保护，因为有资产抵押证券是由发行者保留信贷风险，而不是将其证券化，同时它必须保证用来替代不良资产的健康资产能够达到弥补所发行证券规模的标准。为了使其更具安全性，资产池中有抵押的债券要比普通债券价值大。
The attractions to policymakers in America are obvious. For jittery investors, these are instruments that offer safer exposure to America’s mortgage market. For issuers, the costs of funding are lower than raising unsecured debt, and issuance does not depend on the revival of the securitisation markets. Only two covered bonds have been issued in America to date, both of them before the crunch, but a concerted effort is under way to kick-start things.
有资产抵押证券对美国政策制定者的吸引是明显的。对那些战战兢兢的投资者来说，这种证券工具能为美国抵押信贷市场提供一个更加安全的方向。对发行者来说，有资产抵押证券的成本要比筹集无担保债务低的多，同时它的发行不依赖于证券市场的复苏。到目前为止，只有两支此类证券在美国发行，并且都是在信贷危机前，但是一支协议中的证券正在启动中。
In July Hank Paulson, America’s ubiquitous treasury secretary, unveiled a set of stringent guidelines detailing what kind of mortgage collateral can be used to secure the bonds. In tandem, Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo have announced plans to issue covered bonds. According to Tim Skeet at Merrill Lynch, the first issues could well happen before the end of the year.
七月，美国财政部长保尔森公布了一整套严格的指导方针，明细了什么样的抵押资产可以用以担保债券安全。紧跟着，美国银行、花旗集团、摩根大通和富国银行都宣布了发行有资产抵押债券的计划。美林证券的Tim Skeet表示，第一支证券的发行可以在年底之前完成。
It is too soon to say how big the market might eventually be. There are several constraints on growth. The most obvious are regulatory. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which is responsible for reimbursing depositors when banks fail, does not want its claims on assets to be subordinated to others and has (initially) capped covered-bond issuance at just 4% of banks’ liabilities. Strict criteria on what assets can be used in the cover pool are necessary to reassure investors, but will leave many mortgage loans out in the cold.
预测这个市场最终会有多大还为时尚早。有几个因素会限制它的发展。最明显的就是监管。联邦存款保险公司（它的职责是当银行破产时，偿还存款人的存款）可不想让那些由他主张权利的资产被纳入到其它担保中，并且设定了有资产抵押债券发行的上限,为其银行负债的4%。关于可放入资金池的担保资产类型的严格标准对于安抚投资者来说是必要的，但同时会使很多抵押借款遭到排斥。
The markets are another source of uncertainty. Promoting the merits of a new mortgage-backed debt instrument is not the easiest sell at the moment. Issuers might find that other sources of funding, such as advances from America’s 12 Federal Home Loan Banks, are cheaper. Moreover, keeping mortgages on the books, rather than securitising them, means that banks have to deal with headaches like “prepayment risk”, when mortgage borrowers refinance their policies and fail to generate the expected return. “Anything that helps to open up the mortgage market is a good thing at this point,” says Sharon Haas of Fitch, a rating agency. Just do not expect Prussian-style dominance.
市场可能是另一个不确定因素。在当前的环境下，对于一种新的有抵押支持债券价值的推销可不是一个容易的买卖。发行者可能会发现其它来源的债券，比如说美国12家联邦家庭贷款银行的贷款更加便宜。除此之外，当抵押借款人为其项目再融资或者不能产生预期的回报时，使抵押证券载入名册而不是将其证券化意味着银行不得不处理诸如”预付风险”之类令人头痛的问题。评级机构惠誉的Sharon Haas表示，”在这个节点上，任何有助于开发抵押信贷市场的行动都是一件好事情。” 只是不要希望会出现普鲁士式的主宰。 31 August Lessons from a “lost decade”
从”失去的十年”中学习
Aug 21st 2008
From The Economist print edition
Will America follow Japan into a decade of stagnation?
美国是否会步日本后尘，进入十年停滞？
AS FALLING house prices and tightening credit squeeze America’s economy, some worry that the country may suffer a decade of stagnation, as Japan did after its bubble burst in the early 1990s. Japan’s property bubble was also fuelled by cheap money and financial liberalisation and-just as in America-most people assumed that property prices could not fall nationally. When they did, borrowers defaulted and banks cut their lending. The result was a decade with average growth of less than 1%.
随着美国国内房价的下跌和信贷紧缩的持续加强，一些人开始担心美国可能经历像日本上个世纪90年代早期经济泡沫破灭后那样的十年滞胀。低息贷款和金融自由化加速了日本资产泡沫化，就像现在的美国，大部分人都认为房地产价格不会出现全国性下跌。然而当它发生时，借债人逃债，银行断供。结果就是十年平均不到1%的经济增长率。
Most dismiss the idea that America could suffer the same fate as Japan, but some of the differences are overstated. For example, some claim that Japan’s bubble was much bigger than America’s. Yet average house prices nationwide rose by 90% in America between 2000 and 2006, compared with a gain of 51% in Japan between 1985 and early 1991, when Japanese home prices peaked (see left-hand chart). Prices in Japan’s biggest cities rose faster, but nationwide figures matter more when gauging the impact on the economy. Japanese home prices have since fallen by just over 40%. American prices are already down by 20%, and many economists reckon they could fall by another 10% or more.
大部分人都不太在意这样的观点：美国可能经历像日本一样的命运，但是一些区别被夸大了。例如，一些人认为日本的泡沫要比美国的大很多。然而，从2000年到2006年，全美房屋价格上涨了90%，而日本房价从85年开始到91年初达到顶峰，六年间只上涨了51%（如左表）。日本那些大城市的房价上涨要更快，但是对测定房价对经济影响更重要的则是全国的房价数据。日本房价从高点下落以来跌去仅 40%多，而美国房价已经下跌了20%，并且很多经济学家预计房价还会跌去10%或者更多。
What about commercial property? Again, average prices rose by less in Japan (80%) than in America (90%) over those same periods. Thus Japan’s property boom was, if anything, smaller than America’s. Japan also had a stockmarket bubble, which burst a year earlier than that in property. This hurt banks, because they counted part of their equity holdings in other firms as capital. But its impact on households was modest, because only 30% of the population held shares, compared with over half of Americans.
那么商用物业又如何呢？同样如此，在上述时期内，日本的平均价格上涨了80%，要少于美国的90%。因此如果说日本的房地产泡沫与美国相比有什么区别的话，那就是它要比美国的小。日本在股票市场上同样存在泡沫，它是先于房地产泡沫一年破灭。这使得银行业严重受损，因为银行把在其它公司持有的股份算作资本。但是它对普通人的影响是饿不限的，因为只有30%的日本居民持有股票，而在美国却有一半人以上。
Nor were Japanese policymakers any slower than American ones to cut interest rates and loosen fiscal policy after the bubble burst, contrary to popular misconceptions. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) began to lower interest rates in July 1991, soon after property prices began to decline. The discount rate was cut from 6% to 1.75% by the end of 1993. Two years after American house prices started to slide, the Fed funds rate has fallen from 5.25% to 2% (see right-hand chart). A study by America’s Federal Reserve concluded that Japanese interest rates fell more sharply in the early 1990s than required by the “Taylor rule”, which establishes the appropriate rate using the amount of spare capacity and inflation.
与通常的误解相反，在泡沫破灭后，日本的政策制定者迅速地采取降低利率和宽松的财政政策措施，这一点不比美国慢。房地产价格一开始下降，日本银行就于 1991年7月开始降低利率。到1993年末，日本的贴现率从6%下降到1.75%。而美国在房价下跌两年之后，联邦基金利率从5.25%下降到了2% （如右图）。美联储的研究表明，日本的利率水平在上个世纪90年代早期下降的要比泰勒规则所要求的多很多，泰勒规则是通过闲置生产能力的数量和通胀的情况来确定出适当的利率水平。
Japan also gave its economy a big fiscal boost. The cyclically adjusted budget deficit (which excludes the automatic impact of slower growth on tax revenues) increased by an annual average of 1.8% of GDP in 1992 and 1993-similar to America’s budget boost this year. Japan’s monetary and fiscal stimulus did help to lift the economy. After a recession in 1993-94, GDP was growing at an annual rate of around 2.5% by 1995. But deflation also emerged that year, pushing up real interest rates and increasing the real burden of debt. It was from here on that Japan made its biggest policy mistakes. In 1997 the government raised its consumption tax to try to slim its budget deficit. And with interest rates close to zero, the BoJ insisted that there was nothing more it could do. Only much later did it start to print lots of money.
日本也通过积极的财政政策来促进经济的发展。周期调整预算赤字（它排除了经济缓慢增长对税收收入的自发影响）在92年和93年间平均每年增长约为GDP的1.8%，这点与美国今年的预算增加差不多。日本的货币和财政政策刺激确实有助于日本经济走出泥潭。在经历了93到94年度经济的衰退后，日本2005年GDP增长率达到了2.5%。但是通货紧缩也在那年显现，这推高了实际利率，同时也增加了真实的还贷压力。自此日本在通货紧缩问题上犯下它最大政策错误。1997年，日本政府通过提高消费税来试图减少其财政赤字，并且使利率水平接近于0，日本银行坚信除此之外并无其它可做的。在那很久以后，日本银行开始增发了大量钞票。
America’s inflation rate of above 5% is an advantage. Not only are real interest rates negative, but inflation is also helping to bring the housing market back to fair value with a smaller fall in prices than otherwise. But in another way America is more exposed than Japan was. When its bubble burst in 1991, Japan’s households saved 15% of their income. By 2001 saving had fallen to 5%, which helped to prop up consumer spending. America’s saving rate of close to zero leaves no such cushion.
美国高于5%的通胀率是对自身有利的。在美国不仅实际利率是负的，而且通胀有助于把美国的房地产市场带回到一个公平价值水平，而这仅需要使价格小幅下降。但从另方面讲，美国比日本更危险。在91年经济泡沫破灭后，日本居民将其收入的15%用于储蓄。到2001年时，这个比例已经下降到了5%,这有助于支撑日本消费支出。而美国接近0的储蓄率却不能提供这个缓冲。
The perils of procrastination
拖延的危险
John Makin, at the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank, argues that monetary and fiscal relief were necessary but not sufficient to revive Japan’s economy. The missing ingredient was a clean-up of the banking system, on which Japanese firms were more dependent than their American counterparts. Japanese banks hid their bad loans beneath opaque corporate structures, and curtailed new lending to profitable businesses. A vicious circle developed, whereby banks’ bad loans depressed growth which then created more bad loans.
一智囊团–美国企业研究所的John Makin认为货币和财政上的调节是必要的，但不足以使日本经济复兴。日本最缺失的要素是银行系统的大清理，这也使日本企业比他们的美国同行更加依赖银行。日本银行把他们的坏账隐藏于不透明的公司治理结构下，并缩减了对那些利润丰厚业务的贷款。一个恶性循环就这样开始了，银行坏账拖累经济增长，而反过来又产生更多坏账。
In another new report Richard Jerram, at Macquarie Securities, concludes that America “will not come close to repeating the experience of Japan”, because its regulatory system, financial markets and political structure will not let it procrastinate for so long. America has a more transparent regulatory structure which presses banks into recognising losses and repairing their balance-sheets-even if regulators were slow to recognise that the banks were shifting risky securitised assets off their balance-sheets in the first place. But Japan’s regulators for a long while were in cahoots with banks over hiding their bad loans.
麦格理证券Richard Jerram的一份新的研究报告表明：美国不会重走日本的老路。因为美国的监管体系、金融市场和政治结构不会像日本拖延的那么久。美国有着更加透明的监管组织，它会迫使银行发现损失并弥补修复资产表–即使监管当局可能会稍晚发现银行将那些有风险的证券资产转移出资产负债表外。而日本的监管者很长一段时间以来则与银行狼狈为奸，共同隐藏坏帐。
Over the past year, American banks have been quicker than those in Japan in the 1990s to disclose and write off losses and raise new capital. In Japan it took a long while before the political will was there to use taxpayers’ money to plug the banking system. A big test for America’s Treasury will be how quickly it recognises the need to nationalise Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the teetering mortgage giants.
在过去的几年，相比上个世纪90年代的日本银行业，美国银行已经很快地批露并核销了那些损失，同时补充了资本金。而在日本，政府很长时间以后才动用纳税人的钱来修补银行体系。对于美国财政部来说最大的考验是需要多长时间才能认识到将那两个摇摇欲坠的住房抵押贷款巨头房利美、房地美国有化的必要性。
One advantage over Japan, says Mr Jerram, is that America is spreading the costs of its housing bust across other countries. Foreigners hold a large slice of American mortgage-backed securities. Sovereign-wealth funds have provided new capital for American banks. And America’s booming exports have helped to support its economy, thanks to the cheap dollar. In contrast, the yen’s sharp appreciation after Japan’s bubble burst hurt exports at the same time as domestic demand was being squeezed.
Jerram先生表示，相对于日本，美国的一个优势是他可以把房地产的损失转移到其它国家。外国人持有大量美国的有抵押贷款证券。国家主权基金也已经为美国银行提供了新的资金。同时美元贬值使得出口商迅速发展，这有助于支持美国经济。相比之下，日本泡沫破灭之后，日元的急剧贬值在导致国内需求萎缩的同时，又严重伤害了出口商。
By learning from Japan’s mistakes, America can avoid a dismal decade. However, it would be arrogant for those in Washington, DC, to assume that Japan’s troubles simply reflected its macroeconomic incompetence. Experience in other countries shows that serious asset-price busts often lead to economic downturns lasting several years. Only a wild optimist would believe that the worst is over in America.
通过吸取日本的教训，美国可以避免一个低落的十年。然而，如果认为日本的经济困境只反映了它宏观经济的无力，那么无疑华盛顿特区那帮人是傲慢的。其它一些国家的经历已经告诉我们：严重的资产价格泡沫经常会导致经济长达几年的低迷。也只有那些疯狂的乐观者才会相信美国最坏的时期已经过去。
16 June Investors are caught between the desire for growth and the fear of inflation
投资者陷入到向往增长、害怕通胀的两难中。
POOR Goldilocks is suddenly out of sorts. After five years when economic conditions have been, like baby bear's porridge, “just right”—strong growth and low inflation—they are now spoiling fast. And as central banks begin to react vigorously, investors are taking fright. 3 June A POEM FOR THE WEST 给西方人的一首诗 When we were the Sick Man of Asia, we were called The Yellow Peril. 当我们被称为东亚病夫时，我们被你们称为“黄祸”。 When we are billed to be the next Superpower, we are called The Threat. 当我们被宣传为下一个超级大国时，我们被你们称为威胁。 When we closed our doors, you smuggled drugs to open markets. 当我们闭关锁国时，你们用毒品来打开我们的市场。 When we embrace Free Trade, you blame us for taking away your jobs. 当我们信奉贸易自由时，你们却责骂我们夺走了你们的工作。 When we were falling apart, you marched in your troops and wanted your fair share. 当我们动荡不安、四分五裂时，你们的军队闯进来要求公平分赃。 When we tried to put the broken pieces back together again, "Free Tibet," you screamed, "It was an Invasion!" 当我们希望实现统一时，你们却叫嚣解放西藏，称我们是入侵者。 When tried Communism, you hated us for being Communist. 当我们尝试共产主义时，你们憎恨我们是共产主义者。 When we embrace Capitalism, you hate us for being Capitalist. 而当我们吸收了资本主义时，你们又恨我们是资本家。 When we have a billion people, you said we were destroying the planet. 当我们有十亿人民时，你们说我们正在摧残这个星球。 When we tried limiting our numbers, you said we abused human rights. 当我们实行计划生育时，你们又说这压迫了人权。 When we were poor, you thought we were dogs. 当我们贫穷时，你们认为我们是狗。 When we loan you cash, you blame us for your national debts. 当我们有钱借给你们了，你们又指责我们使你们负了债。 When we build our industries, you call us Polluters. 当我们大兴工业时，你们称我们是污染者。 When we sell you goods, you blame us for global warming. 当我们卖给你们商品时，你们又责备我们助长了温室效应。 When we buy oil, you call it exploitation and genocide. 当我们购买石油时，你们说这是剥削和屠杀。 When you go to war for oil, you call it liberation. 当你们为石油而发起战争时，你们却称之为解放。 When we were lost in chaos and rampage, you demanded rules of law. 当我们处于动荡和不安时，你们要求我们依法治理。 When we uphold law and order against violence, you call it violating human rights. 当我们真正依法治乱时，你们又说这是践踏人权。 When we were silent, you said you wanted us to have free speech. 当我们沉默寡言时，你们要求我们言论自由。 When we are silent no more, you say we are brainwashed-xenophobics. 当我们不再沉默时，你们称我们被洗脑后一致仇外。 Why do you hate us so much, we asked. 你们为什么如此憎恨我们？我们问。 "No," you answered, "we don't hate you." 你们回答：不，我们不恨你们。 We don't hate you either. But, do you understand us? 我们也不恨你们，但是你们理解我们吗？ "Of course we do," you said, "We have AFP, CNN and BBC's…… “当然了”，你们说：“我们有AFP，CNN和BBC等，（它们会帮我们了解你们）……” What do you really want from us? 你们究竟想从我们这里得到什么？ Think hard first, then answer……Because you only get so many chances." 先思考再回答，你们只是想找寻一切机会制造麻烦。 Enough is Enough, Enough Hypocrisy for This One World. 够了，这个世界已经变得过分的伪善。 We want One World, One Dream, and Peace on Earth. 我们只是想要一个世界，一个梦想，一个和平的地球。 This Big Blue Earth is Big Enough for all of Us. 让这个巨大的蓝色星球成为我们共同的家园。 29 May
when she was asked if she had heard about the earthquake in China. Stone responded：
Of course I have. You know it was very interesting, because at first, you know, I am not happy about the way the Chinese are treating Tibetans because I don't think anyone should be unkind to anyone else. And so I have been very concerned about how to think and what to do about that, because I don’t like...that. And I've been concerned about how should we deal with Olympics because they've not been nice to Dalai Lama, who is a good friend of mine. And all this earthquake this stuff happened and I thought, is that karma? When you are not nice the bad things happen to you. Then I got a letter from the Tibetan Foundation, and they wanted to go and be helpful. And that made my cry. And they asked me if I'd write a quote for that and I said I would. That was a big lesson to me, that sometimes you have to learn to put you head down to be at service even to the people who aren't nice to you. That's a big lesson for me."
当被问到是否听说中国地震了，莎朗 斯通 回答：
当然我听说了，你知道那是非常吸引注意力的，因为首先，你知道，我对中国对待西藏的方式很不满意，因为我不认为任何人可以对他人不友善。所以我非常关心如何思考和处理相关的事件，就是因为我不喜欢那..我也想过我们要如何应对奥运会,基于他们对达赖喇嘛不友善---他是我的好朋友。所以我想这地震是否是佛教里的“业”---恶有恶报？可是我收到了一封藏独机构的信件，他们想去援助----这把我弄哭了。他们问我是否写一个什么表示支持，我说我会的。他们的表现给我上了一堂大课！就是说必须学会，面对对你不好的人，你也要低下头去援助。这是我的一大收获。 26 May 胡舒立 
中国需要一个建立在法治基础之上的、权力与责任明晰的、落实到专门机构、中央与地方分工明确的巨灾风险管理体系
中国有史以来就灾害不断，近年来更有愈演愈烈之势。从SARS到禽流感，从年初的冰雪之灾，到本月的汶川大地震，大灾频仍，旱涝台风亦连年肆虐。诸灾之中，尤以此番汶川大地震最为惨烈，令国人世人心灵震撼，激情涌动。
有道是“多难兴邦”。过去的两周，举国哀恸，国人对此古训必是感慨良多。但是，多难并不必然兴邦。当我们由激情而思索，由思索而行动，从大规模的救人赈灾，转为更大规模的灾区重建，进而转为未来更大范围的减灾防灾，我们仍需不懈地探索和建立崭新的巨灾防范体制。
答案越来越清晰：中国需要一个建立在法治基础之上的、权力与责任明晰的、落实到专门机构、中央与地方分工明确的巨灾风险管理体系。这样的体系注重未雨绸缪，注重科学专业，注重多方配合，尤其注重可执行性。数万骤然逝去的生命再度警示我们，建立这样的体系是何等重要和迫切！
这一体系必须对自然灾害区分轻重缓急，界定政府和民间的责任，并且有全社会的广泛参与。
这一体系当能对巨灾风险进行识别和评估。需要统一管理，需要科学对待，需要成本投入，尤其需要法治意义上的公开透明。
风险识别和评估的范畴远比“预报”或预测广泛，其核心内涵是风险识别和信息共享。即使眼前没有灾难发生，全社会都应知道自己面临何种自然风险的威胁；灾难发生的概率、程度如何？危害多大？涉及多少民众，多少房屋、道路、桥梁、厂房、商场？有多少属于经济存量的资产暴露在风险范围之内? 种种变量需要随着经济发展作出动态分析。
这一体系注重未雨绸缪，当能把自然灾害的后果尽可能降低。古今中外无数血的教训告诉人们，必须把关注的重点从对巨灾的事后反应，逐步转移到事前防范。现在，许多人在反思学校、幼儿园的建筑质量。其实，所有人员密集的公共建筑和设施，都应该对建筑的防灾标准作出明确而严格的规定。若要行之有效，还需辅之以配套的激励与惩罚机制，并且有专门的机构跟踪检查和执行，并有充足的资金保证。否则，“豆腐渣工程”仍然无法根除。
在1923年9月1日发生的日本关东大地震中，也曾出现大量校舍倒塌、学生集体遇难的惨剧。此后，日本秉持“学生的生命维系着国家未来”的理念，明确规定，学校教学楼必须使用当时最先进的建筑模式钢筋混凝土结构。从那时起，学校便成为每一个地方最牢固的建筑，成为地震后灾民的首选避难场所。不过，在1995年的阪神大地震中，仍有部分校舍倒塌，随后，日本政府实施基于新标准的“校舍补强计划”。然而，13年来，这一计划未能全面落实，公立中小学经费相对不足是重要原因。日本的经验和教训，都可为中国镜鉴。
当然，怎样的事前防范，都不能完全省却灾后的救援。时间就是生命。此次汶川大地震告诉人们，救灾行动艰巨复杂，其紧急迫切与艰险的情势，不亚于一场浩大、复杂的战役。在巨灾瞬间发生之后，如何才能确保不失分秒地作出正确反应？我们迫切需要在总结经验教训的基础上，建立对突发性巨灾的综合协调反应机制，协调各方力量，及时、有效和可靠地对灾害展开救助。
地震等自然巨灾之摧毁力令人悚然。应对灾厄，民众需要具备防灾抗震的知识和物资储备，而政府和社会组织在救灾行动中，其人力、物力等资源，需要明确优先顺序，作出合理安排。军队与地方各部门的救援协调更需要统一、专业的指挥。享有采访自由、尽职尽责的媒体，也应当懂得如何以专业素养，尊重救灾行动大局。
综合协调的巨灾风险管理体系离不开有效的融资安排。地震发生后，多渠道社会捐赠场面感人，成果显著，所集资金也正可成为此次救灾资金的重要补充。但也应当看到，灾后社会捐赠，特别是普通群众的捐赠，主要是一种爱心表达；而民间慈善机构的有组织捐赠和国际援助，也只能起到资金补充作用。救灾资金主渠道仍然也只能是政府财政资金和政府主导的巨灾保险与再保险机制。须知首当其冲的永远是最弱势群体，而纵使在目前中国财政资金较为充分的情况下，其上限仍然存在。有了行之有效的巨灾保险与再保险体系，还可以通过与风险挂钩的保费与赔付机制，反过来正面影响巨灾的防范，例如，激励和约束建筑标准的提高和执行。
当然，无论是现在还是将来，不可避免地需要让公众确信捐赠资金得以高效安全运用，需要让财政救灾拨款及时到位，需要执行严格的采购政策和程序，并且尽可能地公开透明，等等。此次巨灾过后，海内外华人乃至国际友人，不分妇孺贫富，纷纷伸出援助之手。确保捐赠钱物的使用高效透明，其意义超越经济，事关民族凝聚力的长远。
说到底，对巨灾的管理，反映一个国家的经济社会发展阶段，体现其公共治理水平。制度从建立到完善，从纸上规划到深入人心的实施，需要多年的持续努力，亦难免付出沉重的代价。当前，民气可贵，理当抓住良机，高瞻远瞩地思考和设计巨灾风险管理的制度框架。
中国正处于多灾时段，这是无法回避的事实。中国政府对防灾已给予相当重视。从由国务院副总理挂帅的国家减灾委员会，到去年8月下发的《国家综合减灾“十一五”规划》，无不表明对巨灾风险的防范和治理，已经提上政府的议事日程。此次国家领导人在数小时内亲临巨灾现场，给世人留下深刻印象；广大军人和民众奋不顾身、顽强尽责地抢险救人，更是令世人动容。然而，从年初的冰雪灾害，到如今的汶川大地震，都显示出既有机制尚不能完全满足实际需求。面对中国社会经济发展现实，现行高度军事化的救灾模式之有效性值得肯定，但也必须看到其中的不足。同样值得警惕的是，无论如何，不应将强有力的政府简化为“大政府”，甚至因此缅怀命令经济的“优越性”。
灾难恐怖总会过去，重创的伤口需要平复，但是，这次地震肯定不是中国遭受的最后一次巨大灾害。成千上万的生命和血泪的教训，不会也不应淡忘，必将促进中国建立起一个综合协调的巨灾风险管理体系。这是中国的历史责任，也必将成为中国对人类社会的重大贡献。■ 25 May On the poverty line
贫困线上
Has “a dollar a day” had its day?
一美元一天的标准是否已经过时？
IN DECEMBER 2007 the World Bank unveiled the results of the biggest exercise in window shopping in history. Scouts in 146 countries scoured stalls, supermarkets and mail-order catalogues, recording the price of more than 1,000 items, from 500-gram packets of durum spaghetti to low-heeled ladies' shoes.
在2007年12月，世界银行公布了历史上关于逛商场的最大的调查结果。在146个国家追踪他们的scoured stalls（翻译不出，求救），超市和邮购目录，记录超过1000种价格目录，从硬粒小麦意粉500克小包到低跟的女士鞋子。
This vast enterprise enabled the bank to compare the purchasing power of many countries in 2005. It uncovered some statistical surprises. Prices in China, for example, were much higher than earlier estimates had indicated, which meant the Chinese income in 2005 of 18.4 trillion yuan ($2.2 trillion at then-market exchange rates) could buy less than previously thought. At a stroke, the Chinese economy shrank, in real terms, by 40%.
2005年，很多企业使许多国家增强了购买力。这份报告揭露了一些令人惊奇的统计数据。例如，关于中国的经济实力，可能以前被高估了，在2005年，意味这中国国民收入18.4万亿元可能是少于原有估计。 一下子，中国经济比实际收缩了40%。
Since then, many scholars have wondered what this economic demotion means for the bank's global poverty counts. It famously draws the poverty line at “a dollar a day”, or more precisely $1.08 at 1993 purchasing-power parity (PPP). In other words, a person is poor if they consume less than an American spending $1.08 per day in 1993. By this yardstick 969m people suffered from absolute poverty in 2004, a drop of over 270m since 1990. The world owed this progress largely to China, where poverty fell by almost 250m from 1990 to 2004.
自此以后，许多专家想知道这个经济排名针对世界银行对全球贫困人数的统计。世界银行画了一条著名的贫困线在“一美元每天”上，或者更加精确到1.08美元，相当于在1993年购买力 (PPP)。 换句话说， 1993年，定义一个人处于贫困就是他们比每天消费1.08美元美国人消费的还要少。按照这个标准， 2004年，9亿6900万人遭受了绝对贫穷，自1990年以来减少了2亿7千万。这应该感谢中国对世界 的贡献，中国的贫困人口从1990年到2004年减少了2亿5千万。
But if the Chinese economy was 40% smaller than previously thought, surely its poverty count must be correspondingly higher. Surjit Bhalla, of Oxus Investments, speculated that China's toll would increase by more than 300m. He mischievously accused the bank's number-crunchers of conspiring to lift the poverty count so as to keep their employer in business beyond its natural life.
但是如果中国经济规模缩水40%，可以确定的是其贫困人口就会相应的增加。来自Oxus 的Surjit Bhalla推测中国的损失将超过3亿。他恶作剧地指责了世界银行的数字是企图提高贫困线以便他们的雇主只是提供生命所需的部分。
每天学习一点点。。
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